Suchergebnisse

The expectation that a customs union in Europe will ultimately lead to political unification is based on the so-called spillover effect. This effect operates whenever any step toward integration creates new needs and fresh demands to proceed further in the same direction. Thus a customs union may create pressures to integrate not only commodity markets but capital markets as well. An integration of capital markets in turn may necessitate currency unification for its effective functioning, and a unified currency finally may imply a pooling of sovereignties sufficiently complete to destroy the separate identities of the participating nation-states. The process could also work in the opposite direction: from an insistence on the integrity of the nation-state to an ultimate rejection of the customs union itself.

Recent schemes for international currency reform are unrealistic to the extent that they are derived as optimum solutions to economic problems alone. International currency arrangements are instances of international organization generally, and consequently fall within the scope of political sociology as much as—if not more than—of pure economics. Political complications must therefore not only be acknowledged, as they usually are, but analyzed as well, as they often are not. This essay represents an inquiry in that direction.